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Mathematical Relativism:  
logic, grammar, and arithmetic in cultural comparison 
 
Abstract  
Cultural relativism is supposed to be a bold and provocative thesis. In this paper we 
challenge the idea that it is an empirical thesis, i.e., one that is supported through 
anthropological and historical examples. We focus on mathematical relativism, the 
view that a mathematics from another culture or time might be so radically divergent 
from our mathematics that ‘theirs’ would stand in direct conflict with ‘ours’ (and in 
that sense constitute an alternative mathematics).  
We question in what sense the examples given to support the general thesis are 
relativistic about mathematics and argue that on close inspection they are not, and 
certainly not in any radical sense. We do not contest the fact that there can be great 
mathematical diversity between cultures, but wonder whether it makes sense to talk of 
‘the same’ mathematical forms in heterogeneous mathematical environments. Finally, 
while relativists see the later Wittgenstein as providing support for their own thesis, 
we claim that Wittgenstein argues against both realism and relativism.  
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Introduction 
This article is part of a critical analysis of the way empirical examples feature in 
arguments for cultural relativism, which we take to be the thesis that logic, grammar, 
and mathematics are, in some sense, only locally valid1.  Our interest lies in pinning 
down just what ‘in some sense’ might amount to. In companion papers 
(Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, forthcoming a,b) we deal with logical and linguistic 
relativism, while in this article we discuss a variety of examples of different forms of 
mathematical relativism – for example Watson (1987, 1990), Verran (2000a, 2000b, 
2001), Bloor (1973, 1976, 1994), Jennings (1988), Raven (1996), and Reed and Lave 
(1979). We are aware that these examples only fall uneasily under one umbrella term. 
As Louch (2000 [1966], p.247) remarks: 
cultural relativism is less a single doctrine or position than a 
collection of them.  A number of different and logically 
unconnected views have been put forth under this label. 
What we are concerned with is the way in which the sociological or historical 
examples are presented and the way in which conclusions are drawn from them.  In 
our view, the conclusions are typically not sustained by the offered evidence and 
alternative characterizations of it are at least as plausible. That is to say, we question 
in what sense these studies are relativistic about mathematics and argue that 
‘relativism’ is a misnomer for instances of cultural heterogeneity. 
                                                 
1 There are yet other variations in the cultural relativist’s use of evidence, such as those of cultural 
psychology, which are addressed in a related paper (Greiffenhagen, forthcoming). 
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The thing that seems most threatening about relativism is its implication (not 
necessarily overtly advocated) that cultural differences of numbers or counting 
practices carry ontological consequences. Mathematical relativism, by saying that 
mathematics is not universally but only locally true, seems to subvert realists’ or 
idealists’ claims about the generality of mathematics and about the stability of 
material nature.  According to the relativistic thesis it is possible that there are cultures 
which not only have a patently different form of mathematical practice from ours, but 
where within that practice what ‘we’ take for a mathematical truth is directly 
contradicted: ‘here’ two oranges added to five oranges would give us seven oranges, 
but ‘there’ it would give us eleven of them.   
We doubt that there can be the radically different mathematics that relativists 
envisage, i.e., aspects of mathematics that are conceptually or ontologically 
confrontational with ours.  However, we are not denying that there are many cultural 
variations in numbers and counting practices – or that some of them might be hard for 
us to make sense of2.  To give a few examples: the French call 80 “quatre-vingt” 
(which could be ‘represented’ as 420) while the English call it “eighty” (810); 
while the English group three digits together (thousands) the Chinese group four 
digits together (ten thousands, wan in Chinese), hence “fifty thousand” (501,000) in 
English but “wu wan” (510,000) in Chinese; and the Oksapmin have devised a body-
counting system up to twenty-seven, rather than the Western finger-counting up to ten 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Baker and Hacker’s (1985, pp. 323-325) description of a traditional Japanese 
system for telling the time. 
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(e.g., Saxe, 1982; Saxe and Moylan, 1982).  These (and many, many more) are 
examples of cultural variation in mathematical practices. However, they are despite 
their differences also readily recognizable as diverse forms of mathematics and 
relatively easy to translate, coordinate, and learn. In contrast, for relativists these 
kinds of differences seem to exhibit an ontological divergence, as they raise questions 
about what numbers and mathematics ‘are’, e.g.:  
[this study] raises the challenging question of what mathematics and 
logics are in the contexts of working across cultures. (Verran, 
2000a, p.58) 
My contention is that ‘natural number’ is a cultural construct, 
differently formulated in different societies. (Watson, 1990, p.283) 
Many of the examples that we discuss in this paper explicitly draw upon the later 
Wittgenstein.  We also approach these questions from a Wittgensteinian perspective, 
but draw very different implications from his writings.  We agree with relativists that 
Wittgenstein’s writings contain a sustained attack on realist theories.  However, 
relativists the relativist reading of Wittgenstein (e.g. Bloor, 1973, 1976) sees 
Wittgenstein as developing an alternative (relativistic) theory of social life – a theory 
that could, in their view, be improved and advanced through a more careful 
presentation of ‘empirical’ historical or sociological examples. In contrast, we see 
Wittgenstein as not only attack realism, but also attacking relativism – by questioning 
the coherence and sense of their respective claims. In our view, Wittgenstein argues 
that before we can ask whether a certain theory is true or false, we need to explore 
whether the theory says anything intelligible. 
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An exemplary case: Mr. Ojo 
We will try to show that the kind of relativist project we are debating here is based on 
two assumptions: 
(1) that being able to do sums requires the possession of an ontology about what 
numbers are (i.e., what they stand for or how they can connect with things in 
the world);   
(2) that this ontology is of the same form that foundationalist philosophers of 
science and mathematics (e.g., von Neumann, Zermelo, Frege, or Carnap) 
engage in (as though one of two equivalent formalizations could more closely 
match the understanding that ordinary users have of everyday arithmetic). 
We begin by exhibiting these two assumptions in Helen Verran’s3 prize-winning 
treatment of teaching arithmetic in Western and Yoruba schools (Watson, 1987, 1990; 
Verran, 2000a,b, 2001).  In our view, Verran’s renderings exaggerate the divergence 
between two mathematically equivalent ways of measuring length, both of which are 
comfortably contained within ‘our’ Western arithmetic. Her aim is to demonstrate a 
substantial cultural difference in ‘concepts of length’, but she thereby disregards the 
fact that the two methods presuppose the same specification of an individual’s height 
and only vary in the ways in which that height is determined.  
                                                 
3 Helen Verran used to publish as Helen Watson.  We will throughout refer to her as ‘Verran’, citing, 
where necessary, her earlier papers as ‘Watson’. 
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Verran presents the case of a Yoruba teacher, Mr. Ojo, whose teaching style is 
contrasted with a Western way of teaching pupils how to measure people’s heights.  
The Western teaching method is explained thus:  
In the lab we had measured each other: we used the string to 
represent height, lay the string on the floor and used chalk to record 
the length.  Then when one of the few metre rulers became 
available, we measured the distance between chalk marks and 
recorded the measurement in a chart (Verran 2000a, p. 59). 
Rather than doing the same, Mr. Ojo used another procedure, which also involved one 
piece of string.  However, instead of the meter ruler Mr. Ojo used a card of 10cm 
length with which he measured the string:  
He called a small boy to the front: with the end of string just under 
the boy’s heel, he held his finger at the point on the string which 
matched the top of the boy’s head. Tying a loose knot at this point, 
he took the other end of the string from under the boy's foot; holding 
this at one end of a card he wound the length of string around until 
he came to the knot.  Then he instructed: ‘Count the number of 
strings around the card, e.g., “9” (i.e., 10 cm lengths) and write 
down the number.  Multiply by ten.  How do we multiply by ten? ... 
ninety ... now add the bit of string left over ... Yes, we have 96cm.’ 
(p.60) 
Verran then claims that “Mr Ojo had deviated significantly from the exemplary 
lesson” (p. 60; our emphasis).  The question for us is to figure out what this 
significant difference might be. 
In both cases a piece of string is held against a pupil’s body to capture the height of 
the pupil.  The difference lies in the method used to measure this piece of string.  In 
the first case, the height is stored on the floor by using chalk marks to record the 
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captured height.  These marks are subsequently measured using a meter ruler.  In the 
second case, the piece of string is wrapped around a piece of card of known length.  
Consequently, the number of wrappings and the leftover can be used to calculate the 
height.  
Verran does not claim that the two methods measure different heights.  In other 
words, mathematically the two methods are equivalent, as children who learn the 
former technique and children who learn the latter would not arrive at different 
numerical determinations of height (in fact, children who have learned basic 
computational operations should be able to understand both procedures). The 
difference lies in the instrument used to measure, namely a meter ruler and a card 
respectively.   
For Verran, the different methods based on these different instruments are supposed to 
teach different ‘ontologies’ of height. In other words, because the teaching methods 
are different, the children are supposed to have acquired a different understanding of 
the nature of height. For Verran (2000a, p. 60) this significant difference is the result 
of substituting “the prescribed stretched string and the extending metre” with “a small 
card wound around with string”: 
Disconcertingly he [Mr. Ojo] had measurement of length beginning 
in the plurality of strands of wound-up string rather than in the 
singularity of an extension. Should he have been corrected? (p.60; 
our emphasis). 
Or elsewhere: 
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I was scandalized.  Mr. Ojo was presenting a bundle of short strands 
of string, a plurality, as length instead of demonstrating the 
prescribed singular extension.  […] I was profoundly confused and 
puzzled. (Verran, 2001, p.3) 
Verran thinks that she has observed the teaching of two contrasting (ontological) 
concepts of length, on the one hand, as a “plurality of strands of wound-up string” 
(‘Yoruba’), and, on the other, as “the singularity of an extension” (‘Western’).   
Verran here exhibits the first assumption above, namely that the teaching of the 
concept of length is supposed to involve more than learning how to determine the 
length of a certain item. Verran thinks that apart from being taught how to measure 
the length of things, pupils are also taught something else, something deeper – namely 
an understanding of the essential nature of length.  
Verran brushes over the mathematical equivalence of the two practices of measuring 
and instead stipulates that they imply that a different ontological concept of length is 
being taught.  As this difference is not directly visible in the results of measurements 
(which are the same), Verran in effect interprets the concept of length in a form of 
operationalism, i.e., as though a single procedure of measuring something could 
constitute and fully exhaust the concept of length. For Verran it seems that each 
concept of length will allow only one way of measuring it. As with many others 
discussing everyday arithmetic, she thereby overlooks the interoperability between 
diverse measurement techniques (the concept of length surely involves understanding 
its constancy across different modes of determination).  In other words, Verran 
neglects the extent to which we often have a variety of alternative and equivalent 
practices available to arrive at the same result (as anyone who has ever tried to 
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measure domestic space using whatever domestic objects or body parts are available 
will know).  
Nowhere does Verran demonstrate that the supposed difference between the 
‘Western’ and ‘Yoruba’ concepts ever becomes visible in everyday computations4. 
Furthermore, she neglects the blatant similarities between the two methods of 
measurement, in particular the role of the piece of string which in both cases is 
initially used to capture the pupil’s height (by singular extension).  Even in Mr. Ojo’s 
method (that is supposed to teach a concept of length as a “plurality of strands of 
wound-up string”) the starting point is to represent height as “the singularity of an 
extension”: Mr. Ojo’s operation first gives the string a singular extension (from head 
to foot of the child being measured) and then uses the card to measure the string.  
Note that this does not involve a contrast between two conceptions of length, once as 
a singular “the singularity of an extension” (the straight line) and the other time as “a 
plurality of wound-up strings” (the string wrapped around the card), but instead 
involves using the card to calculate the length of the straight line (which is done by 
treating the card as a singular extension, and the string to represent a simple multiple 
of a number of shorter but equivalent straight line segments, plus a remainder).   
Verran then goes on to exhibit the second assumption mentioned above: in order to 
express the supposed difference between the Yoruba and the Western concept of 
length, she invokes a philosopher of science, namely Rudolf Carnap and his 
Philosophical Foundations of Physics (1966).  Verran argues that for Carnap length is 
                                                 
4 In other words, the ‘difference’ is very much like Wittgenstein’s (1953, §293) beetle in the box. 
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a quantitative concept that captures “universal qualities in […] spatio-temporal 
entities” (Verran, 2000a, p.63).  We do not defend Carnap’s logical positivism, but are 
surprised that it has any implications for the case under discussion. However, Verran 
claims: 
According to [Carnap’s] account of logic and mathematics, Mr Ojo 
is wrong to present an image to the children where length is 
portrayed as a bundle of string whose many strands can be counted 
and manipulated to come up with a single value for length. An 
uninterrupted straight line, sectioned in a subsequent action, 
portrays the proper and only correct way to do length. (p.64) 
According to our understanding of Carnap the only bearing that his philosophy could 
have on this example is the claim that each object will have a unique and definite 
length.  Carnap is concerned with length as a property of objects and for him it is a 
requirement for such a quantitative concept that it will possess a single determination 
for any object.  In other words, for Carnap it is entirely conceivable that we might 
have different techniques to measure length, but it is a requirement that all of these 
techniques will produce the same result.   
As   already mentioned, this is exactly what we witness in the case under   discussion: 
both measuring techniques are, mathematically, equivalent.  Consequently, we cannot 
imagine any grounds upon which Carnap would have objected to Mr. Ojo’s lesson.  In 
other words, Carnap would recognize that Mr. Ojo is teaching children how to 
measure correctly, which in this context means arriving at the appropriate results 
(using measurement in conjunction with calculation, rather than just measurement).   
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Verran here exhibits the relativist’s tendency to conflate length with philosophical 
reflections about the nature of length. However, philosophical disagreements about 
what length ‘is’ are not enough to demonstrate that people’s concepts of length (i.e., 
their understanding of how length is to be measured or calculated) is different.  
The universal character of mathematics 
After this long analysis of one example let us return to the general aim of 
mathematical relativism, which is to contest the claim that arithmetic and mathematics 
are ‘universal’.  In this section we therefore want to review what the universal 
character of mathematics might amount to. 
The practices of our standard arithmetic (i.e., base ten, Arabic numerals, grouping 
thousands together, etc.) are invariant. They are to be done everywhere the same, with 
no room for variation. Given that standard arithmetic is being done (i.e., that we are 
operating within this system), then calculations must be done in ways that satisfy 
these rules and must yield these results, regardless of who is doing it.   
However, standard arithmetic only exercises its compelling and inexorable character 
when one is operating in terms of it.  Standard arithmetic, of itself, does not compel 
anyone to use it. Of course, there might be practical reasons for using it: the 
educational system and the extensive institutionalization of its practice might impose 
on people the practical necessity to learn and use it (if you want to know how much 
money the cash machine will let you have, you had better be able to use arithmetic; 
or, in government policy terms: if you want to get a good job in a sophisticated, well 
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paying form of modern employment, you had better learn arithmetic).  However, 
nothing ‘in’ the system compels people to use this system.  
Furthermore, standard arithmetic does not compel all people to calculate in specific 
ways. There are various ways available for doing calculations (e.g., in your head, with 
your fingers, or using pen and paper) just as there are variable computational forms 
for arriving at the same result (e.g., 23  12 = 230 + 46 = 276 or 23  12 = 240 + 36 = 
276). There is no reason to suppose that all those who are doing arithmetic must 
proceed in the same specific ways in working through a computation, only that those 
doing standard arithmetic must arrive at the same results.   
Is ‘our’ arithmetic then universal? To cast the question in something like the 
Enlightenment idea: Would all rational beings be compelled to accept ‘our’ standard 
arithmetic?  As Wittgenstein would put it: the question contains a mistake. Standard 
arithmetic is not something that we in Western societies ‘accept’.  It is therefore not 
something we accept on rational grounds either (neither do we accept it ‘irrationally’).  
We simply need no grounds to accept the arithmetic we are taught, since this is the 
arithmetic that we are being taught5.   However, saying that we are taught this 
arithmetic does not mean that  
(a) there might not be different ways to solve an arithmetic problem;  
                                                 
5 Imagine a society where children are taught two different arithmetics and then, at a certain age, would 
have to ‘choose’ between them. 
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(b) that we are thereby being taught that this is the only kind of arithmetic there 
can possibly be;  
(c) that we are taught arithmetic as something for whose correctness there is 
evidence and justification that can be given to us.  
From a very early age children are rigorously rehearsed in numeracy practices.  
However, they are not provided with theoretical explanations of them (e.g., historical-
philosophical accounts of why we count with base ten rather than base eight).  
Learning arithmetic is a matter of learning to replicate what other competent users of 
it do.  What one is being taught is how to use the arithmetical system correctly – not 
why it is correct or what makes it correct. In other words, contra relativists such as 
Jennings (1988, p.100) who want to say that we ‘believe’ in 5 + 7 = 12, we would 
argue that arithmetic is not something that anyone believes in6. As Wittgenstein 
(1978) puts it: 
But I feel a temptation to say: one can’t believe that 13  13 = 196, 
one can only accept this number mechanically from somebody else. 
(I §106, p. 76) 
For I want to say: “One can only see that 13  13 = 196, and even 
that one can’t believe. And one can – more or less blindly – accept a 
rule.” (I §109, p. 77) 
We engage in our arithmetic rather than, say, an aboriginal way of counting, simply 
because that is the arithmetic that we have been taught.  This does not mean that we 
                                                 
6 Neither do we drive on the left because we ‘believe’ in it – although one might say that we believe in 
the existence of a Big Bang. 
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therefore ‘disbelieve’ other ways of counting. We engage in ours pretty much because 
it is ours, and they in theirs because it is theirs.  This includes, of course, all kinds of 
practical reasons why we would not want to switch. All kinds of disadvantages for us 
would attach to adopting their system (not least because all kinds of infrastructural 
practices in our society have our form of numeracy built in) and most of ours would 
be useless to them. 
The social/cultural character of mathematics 
It is no great surprise to us that other cultures have different mathematics than we do 
(though the kind of mathematics they have might be somewhat surprising to our 
mathematicians).  In fact, would it not seem much more surprising if anthropologists 
had found cultures which, despite their enormous organizational differences and 
complete cultural autonomy from us, had developed a mathematics thoroughgoingly 
identical to ours? Wouldn’t that seem like the most astonishing thing? 
However, accepting this does not mean that there can be infinite variation between 
cultures in respect of what mathematics can be. We do not say this because we hold 
some realist doctrine about the way in which the nature of things imposes itself upon 
our thought to limit what a mathematics can be, but because of the role translation 
plays: if some other culture’s supposed mathematical practice is barely recognizable 
as such to us, then why have would we identify it as ‘mathematics’?  Without some 
kinship between our and their practice there would seem little point in treating them 
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as playing equivalent parts in the respective cultures7. We might as well conclude that 
these people lack a mathematics, and have instead some other practice that our culture 
does not feature8:   
If you have two different ways of multiplying, why call them both 
multiplying? Why not call one multiplying and the other dividing, or 
one multiplying-A and the other multiplying-B, or any damn thing? 
It is simply that you have two different kinds of calculations and 
you have not noticed that they give different results. (Wittgenstein, 
1976, p. 216) 
In other words, in order to translate an alien practice as ‘mathematics’, there must be 
some significant similarity to our practice of mathematics.  Otherwise, we might find 
a new way of translating that alien practice (as, e.g., karate, feng-shui, or rain-
dancing).  It is only because the alien practice resembles our practice of mathematics 
that we identify it in translation as mathematics. This is not because we assume our 
language has some privileged universality, but because this is how speak in our 
language of what ‘they’ do: 
Money has a special role in our lives, and this is what justifies 
translating foreign terms as ‘money’.  Mathematics has a special 
                                                 
7 The kinship should not be thought of in terms of any specific notation, procedure, or method, but as 
one to be identified with respect to the part that the relevant activity plays in their lives. However odd a 
possible way of totalling up might seem to us, if doing things that way fits into, e.g., buying and selling 
goods in a similar way as it does in ours, then it may well rightly be identified as a way of totalling up. 
8 To avoid the imputation of ethnocentrism, of placing ‘our’ mathematics in a privileged place which 
determines what is ‘really’ mathematics and what is not, we should perhaps say that our point is more 
of the order of: if it doesn’t look like a duck, doesn’t walk like a duck, doesn’t sound like a duck, then 
why on earth are you determined to call it a duck? Ethnocentricism comes with a misplaced pride in 
‘our’ possession of mathematics, such that it would seem a negative point about a culture that it had no 
mathematics, but there is no need to read any such devaluation into the fact that another culture does 
not have the same configuration of institutions we do, however proud of these institutions some of ‘us’ 
might be.  
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role in our lives and special characteristics, and these are what 
justify calling alien practices ‘mathematics’. (Gerrard, 1991, p.139) 
Given that a culture has a practice that could be identified as mathematics, then we 
may reasonably expect that its basic forms9 will be extensively standardized amongst 
the members of that society.  We do not for one moment expect to find that a culture 
features ‘mixed mode’ mathematics, where the distribution of counting practices 
amongst them was arbitrarily, even randomly assorted. We just would not call such a 
mixed mode practice ‘mathematics’ (but perhaps guessing, playing, or consulting an 
oracle).  
We also assume that the kind of mathematics that might have been created in a 
community will be the collective product of the work of a group of mathematicians, 
rather than any single mathematician (whether or not there exists a specific profession 
of mathematicians or mathematics has been developed as part of other activities, e.g., 
accounting or religion). We also assume that many of the features of that mathematics 
(though we cannot really say just which ones) will reflect the way in which those 
mathematicians developed and practiced their craft (though we cannot really say just 
which ones).  We will also expect that the mathematics that culture has developed will 
have something to do with the kinds of activities that the society conducts, and with 
                                                 
9 We do not patronisingly suppose that other societies are only capable of contriving basic 
mathematics, but only that many of them will lack the large guild of full time mathematicians that 
features in ‘our’ society. It is not a question whether other societies are ‘capable’ enough to develop 
‘our’ mathematics – but whether they see the need to develop it.  For example, Gay and Cole (1967) 
remark that among the Kpelle there “are few occasions for counting beyond approximately 30 or 40” 
(p.42). Similarly, the upshot of Saxe’s studies (e.g., Saxe, 1982; Saxe and Moylan, 1982) of the 
Oksapmin’s number use seems to be that their body-counting system up to numbers of twenty-seven 
was appropriate for all practical purposes of their everyday life.  However, with the introduction of 
currency by the colonialists their mathematical system was bound to change. 
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the kinds of circumstances the society provides for their work, the occasions for 
calculating, working out, formalizing, etc. (but again we cannot really say which 
ones).   
Counting and mathematical-philosophical theories of 
counting 
Within relativistic arguments the examples are typically taken from basic 
mathematics, in particular elementary arithmetic (what is often called ‘numeracy’).  
However, despite (or perhaps due to) the basic nature of these examples, one needs to 
be careful to make explicit the level in which they are described by the analyst.  We 
want to distinguish between the everyday practical activities of counting using 
numbers (e.g., when buying goods, looking at a bank account, etc.) and mathematical-
philosophical accounts of counting and number.   
We will take Verran’s study of Yoruba numbers (in Watson, 1990) as an example10. 
Verran notes that natural numbers are among “the most sacred Platonic objects” (p. 
284) and uses Zermelo and von Neumann’s metamathematical-philosophical accounts 
of number to compare English and Yoruba numbers (p. 307).  For us Verran’s project 
thereby commits a category mistake by conflating the common-sense with the 
theoretical-philosophical level.   
                                                 
10 In a later book (Verran, 2001), she repudiates her earlier relativist project.  We will deal with 
Verran’s post-relativist project (our term) in a separate paper.  Here, we only want to mention that even 
in her later work she continues to theoretically-ontologically redescribe mundane practices. For 
example, the example of Mr. Ojo is from her later not her earlier work.  We think a happier way 
forward is ethnomethodological descriptions of practice (see, e.g., Macbeth, 2002). 
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We question whether a mathematical-philosophical schematization could ever capture 
the sense that everyday practical numeracy has. In our view, formal mathematical 
theories are not meant to be a model or representation of our everyday numerical 
practices. In other words, people can engage in counting and calculating even if they 
do not know any formal mathematical-philosophical theories about mathematics. Put 
differently: 
 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, … and 
 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), s(s(s(s(0)))), … 
are not on the same footing (although the second schematizes the same numerical 
progression as the first), but are operating at the different levels of everyday 
practicality on the one hand, and that of technical mathematics on the other.  
Dedekind, in his mathematical-philosophical discussions of number in The nature and 
meaning of numbers (1888), seems to have been aware of this:  
This memoir can be understood by any one possessing what is 
usually called good common sense; no technical philosophic, or 
mathematical, knowledge is in the least degree required.  But I feel 
conscious that many a reader will scarcely recognise in the shadowy 
forms which I bring before him his numbers which all his life long 
have accompanied him as faithful and familiar friends; […]. 
(Dedekind, 1909 [1888], p.33, our emphasis)  
We therefore argue that there is a crucial difference between everyday counting, 
adding, multiplying, etc – and technical mathematical-philosophical accounts of the 
form and structure of number schemes. Those who have mastered basic numeracy do 
so without familiarity with or dependence on formal theories of mathematics.    
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This distinction between mundane practices and philosophical-scientific theories 
about that practice would also apply, say, in physics.  The distinction would be 
between ‘an apple falling from a tree’ and a Cartesian, Aristotelian, Newtonian, or 
Einsteinian physical account of this event. As Triplett (1986, p.447) notes:  
we can know an ordinary observational event – that, say, the apple 
fell from the tree – without knowing the underlying Newtonian 
physics that explains how and why it fell.  We can imagine disputes 
in pre-Newtonian days between, say, Cartesian and Aristotelian 
theoretical accounts of why the apple fell.  Indeed we can imagine 
societies in which no general physical explanation is offered.  But 
we are not thereby inclined to conclude that observers in those 
societies have no knowledge that the apple fell from the tree. 
So why do relativists such as Verran invoke philosophers of science and mathematics 
in discussing rather ordinary or basic examples? In our view this is because the 
(supposed) differences are not to be found on the (observable) practical level, but on 
the (unobservable) theoretical-ontological level.  The kind of difference that Verran is 
after, is not to be found on the practical level (e.g., in the difference between the 
imperial and metric way of measurement).  As she herself notes: 
mathematically, Yoruba quantification and modern Indo-European 
derived quantification were the same (Verran, 2000b, p.356). 
So more is required to give life to claims about the relativity of number. That ‘more’ 
comes in the assumption of a folk psychology on behalf of people, i.e., in adopting a 
Whorfian account of language.  Relativists make the ubiquitous cognitive supposition 
that thinking is theorizing, i.e., that in order to be able to use language, people need a 
theory (an ontology or a worldview) of the constituents of the world.  In Verran’s 
case, she assumes that   being able to count, presupposes an ontology of number.   
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Verran further stipulates that the form of such an ontology of number will be that 
traditional (Western) metaphysics11. This is reflected in Verran’s use of different 
philosophical accounts of numbers to investigate the number use in English and 
Yoruba respectively (rather than trying to show that there are practical differences in 
calculation in the course of conducting everyday affairs).  For Verran there seems to 
be no question that some philosophical account of number will be the correct one; the 
question is only which one. She argues: 
As an English-language user of number, von Neuman’s [sic] 
account seems to me to be intuitively correct. […] In contrast, I 
suggest that a Yoruba speaker would choose Zermelo’s account of 
number as correct. (Watson, 1990, p.307) 
In contrast, following Wittgenstein we argue that neither is correct, because 
correctness it not at issue here.  As we have argued above, both von Neumann’s and 
Zermelo’s accounts of number are not on the same level as our practical grasp of 
numbers.  Furthermore, both von Neumann’s and Zermelo’s accounts are 
representations of the same number system, ‘our’ standard Western arithmetic12, and 
are therefore mathematically equivalent in central respects. There is simply no reason 
why one should think that one of them best formulated ‘our practice’.  
                                                 
11 One of the ironies in some relativistic texts is that the arguments, despite their emphasis on the 
conceptual autonomy of non-Western cultures insist on construing those in terms of the traditional 
preoccupations of Western metaphysics.   
12 It seems like an incredible coincidence that Zermelo, who presumably never even heard of the 
Yoruba, unwittingly formulated a set-theoretical account of number that captured the Yoruba’s concept 
of numbers. 
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Verran provides no mathematical or anthropological explanation as to how either von 
Neumann’s or Zermelo’s account could be taken by an English or Yoruba speaker as 
a better or more intuitive formulation of the number systems being used.  Verran thus 
engages in what we call the ‘ontologising of mundane phenomena’ (for a critique 
along similar lines see Lynch, 1995).  
We think that our view is supported by Quine (whom Verran explicitly draws upon): 
Actually there has been no dispute that I know of over the relative 
intuitiveness of the two versions.  One uses Frege’s version or von 
Neumann’s or yet another, such as Zermelo’s, opportunistically to 
suit the job at hand, if the job is one that calls for providing a 
version of number at all. […] Each of the three progressions or any 
other will do the work of natural numbers, and each happens to be 
geared also to further jobs to which the others are not. (Quine, 1960, 
p.263) 
In other words, a disagreement among mathematicians or philosophers about the 
nature of number does not imply a disagreement in the actual counting practices. Von 
Neumann and Zermelo do not quarrel whether 7 + 5 = 12, but how we should 
(mathematically and/or philosophically) conceptualize this equation.  Verran assumes, 
in a regressively foundationalist manner, that philosophy underpins practices.  
For the relativist, philosophical representations of counting practices are what might 
appropriately portray users’ understanding of, for example, elementary arithmetic.  
Our reaction to this assumption is to wonder:  Is it not surprising that such ontological 
differences make no detectable difference to the results of enumeration and 
computation? That is to say, the results of the various calculations are the same and do 
not show up in intra-cultural contacts.  It might be that cultures use different methods 
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to arrive at these results – but that is not the kind of difference that Verran is arguing 
for (and would hardly be a significant difference). If the relativist does not stipulate 
some kind of ontology on behalf of actors, the relativistic enterprise does not get off 
the ground. 
Calculation within different mathematical systems 
Let us look at another example, developed by Bloor (1973, 1976) and in defense of 
him elaborated by Jennings (1988), namely the possibility of different arithmetical 
systems.  Bloor and Jennings want to challenge the idea that ‘5 + 7 = 12’ is a 
necessary mathematical truth. As in the previous case, on closer inspection of the 
offered materials it turns out that they are a collection of red herrings. Furthermore, 
what is ostensibly persuasive about the materials shows that the biggest red herring of 
all is the idea that a sociology or an anthropology is needed here, i.e., that anything in 
addition to clarity about the mathematical examples is involved.  
What is presented as evidence consists in nothing but what is an elementary and 
familiar mathematical fact, namely that one can construct arithmetical systems on 
different ‘bases’, i.e., rather than counting up to ten one could instead count ‘up to 
eight’, e.g.: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, …  (and hence 5 + 7 would be 14). In 
principle, there is no limit to the bases that one could choose to use – or even no limit 
to systems without any base (which would then be finite, say up to 27 or 134).  As we 
have outlined above, ‘our’ standardized arithmetic is part of the practical affairs of our 
society and hence widespread. It is what children are taught very early in life (and not 
only in school). It is what most of us, knowing little else about mathematics, might 
take mathematics to be.  However, even within our practical life there are places 
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where other kinds of computational practices are employed, e.g., days of the week 
(base 7), hours of the days (base 12 or base 24) – and even non-base systems (the 
alphabet).  
Pointing to another culture where people calculate on another base does not mean that 
‘their’ mathematics stands in opposition to ‘our’ mathematics (any more than their 
cuisine is ‘in opposition’ with ours, or their legal system at odds with ours – though 
they might come into conflict in the context of, say, an imperialist bid to homogenize 
practice across previously independent communities; but that is neither an 
epistemological point nor one with epistemological import).  Of course, there is a 
difference between the two mathematics: in the everyday practice of our society, 
calculation according to base 10 is heavily standardized (but not utterly ubiquitous), 
whereas in their society calculation according to a different base is practiced. It is not, 
however, as though mathematics (any ‘our’ is gratuitous at this point) insists that 
calculation to base 10 is the only possible form of calculation (see our points above). 
Hence different bases do not stand in mathematical ‘conflict’ with another.   
Jennings (1988, p. 100), taking the example of 5 + 7 = 12 argues  
Now it is not very difficult to imagine a culture in which [5 + 7 = 
12] is regarded as false – we can imagine a culture in which 5 + 7 = 
14, or another in which 5 + 7 = 10. 
Jennings here seems to suggest that 5 + 7 = 12 is something that we ‘believe’ in (as he 
puts it: “regarded as false”).  However, as we have argued above, arithmetical 
statements are not ‘believed’ (in contrast to, say, a belief in God or in the strength of a 
football team). 
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To avoid confusion we need to distinguish between conceiving of a statement as an 
expression ‘of and in’ the system or as an expression ‘about’ the system. In other 
words, one can make a mistake within the system (e.g., by claiming that ‘5 + 6 = 12’), 
but the system itself cannot be false (or true) since it provides the standards for 
correctness. The same applies, for example, to the rules of the road: one can drive on 
the wrong side in England (i.e., on the right) – but the English driving rules cannot be 
wrong in and of themselves. Furthermore, as Shanker (1987) notes: 
Even a primitive counting system – e.g. Wittgenstein’s ‘1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
many’ example where ‘3 + 4 = 4 + 5’ – is not ‘wrong’ compared to 
a sophisticated method; it is simply designed to meet different 
needs; which presumably it satisfies.  (pp.298-299)13  
It would be wrong to suppose that the use of a different base shows that ‘5 + 7 = 12’ is 
false, for it would be to suppose that the expressions in the different systems are other 
than superficially alike. The fact that one would not get 12 as the sum of 5 + 7 when 
adding on a different base than 10 does not show that, calculated on base 10, the 
original addition is false.  It is correct if one is counting to base 10.  The operation of 
adding 5 to 7 on another base is a different operation than that involved in adding 
them on base 10.  Further, the two different ways of calculating are not in any 
mathematical conflict with each other, as they are, mathematically, isomorphic: one 
can show that the 5 + 7 = 20 (base 6) is the equivalent of 5 + 7 = 12 (base 10). 
                                                 
13 Note that ‘many’ here is not quite the same as 7 or 9, but more like ‘over 5’ (and both 3+4 and 4+5 
are ‘over five’).  Consequently, ‘equals’ does not play quite the same role here. 
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Jennings is treating ‘5 + 7’ as though it were an identical arithmetical expression in 
two discrete systems, suggesting that someone who calculates on one base is denying 
the correctness of computations made on a different base.  But here is where the fact 
that computation is relative to a system bites back against Jennings.  ‘5 + 7’ is not the 
same proposition in the two different systems, and so even if two propositions of 
superficial similarity have different values in the two systems, it does not show that 
one affirms what the other denies. Unless we follow logical positivists and stipulate 
that ‘(mathematical) marks on the paper’ (such as ‘5 + 7 = 12’) are part of a neutral or 
objective language, then ‘5 + 7 = 12’ is neither right or wrong without specifying 
which system it belongs to.  The expression ‘5 + 7 = 12’ has no sense independently 
of one system or another. Without knowing which arrangement it belongs to, one has 
no means of deciding whether it is right or wrong.  In other words, not just the 
expression but also rightness and wrongness belong to and get determinate sense and 
application from a system. 
In sum, when imagining two cultures, one in which ‘5 + 7 = 12’ and one in which ‘5 + 
7 = 14’, we have two points to bear in mind: firstly, the different systems are (with 
possibly a bit of work) intelligible as mathematically equivalent, and, secondly, the 
‘5’ in the first equation and the ‘5’ in the second equation, although of the same 
graphical shape, play different roles in the two systems.  
In sum, our arguments pertain to the reciprocal intelligibility of mathematical 
expressions in different cultures. For example, it is a commonplace that the Romans 
would not immediately be able to understand ‘our’ mathematics.  Without prior 
instruction in, most importantly, our Arabic numerals, an expression such as ‘2 + 3 = 
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5’ would to a Roman at first seem more like a drawing than a mathematical statement.  
A Roman would simply not be able to read the signs.  However, firstly, a Roman 
could understand and approve the ‘translation’ into Roman numerals (‘II + III = V’), 
and, secondly, with very little instruction a Roman who was already able to calculate 
(with Roman numerals) could be brought up to speed in our mathematics.   
It is easy to forget that many of the purportedly different systems are in fact, from a 
mathematical point of view, equivalent, and can be coordinated with each other (in the 
way that imperial and metric measurement are different but equivalent and can be 
coordinated, so that expressions in one can be converted into expressions in the other).  
This is of course not to deny that one form might not be more practical for specific 
purposes. 
Do we have different numbers than the Ancient Greeks?  
As a final example, we will look at disagreements among Ancient Greek 
mathematicians and philosophers as to whether ‘one’ is a number or not.   This 
example is given by Bloor (1976, Chapter 6) as an example of an ‘alternative’ 
mathematics: 
Is ‘one’ a number? The following statements were commonplace 
in early Greek mathematics: one is not a number; one is neither odd 
nor even but even-odd; two is not an even number.  Nowadays each 
of these claims is rejected as false.  For us, one is a number just like 
any other.  Frege could cite it as such in his arguments without a 
second thought.  (Bloor, 1976, p. 98; emphasis in original) 
Jennings (1988, p.97) uses this example to show that Bloor does, contra his critics 
(e.g., Triplett, 1986, 1988, 1994), demonstrate that an alternative mathematics in a 
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strong conflictual sense is possible. Bloor and Jennings are satisfied that this example 
would demonstrate that ‘alternate mathematics’ could exist, because it seems to imply 
that the Ancient Greek mathematicians did not even agree with us as to something as 
basic as what a ‘number’ is. However, as noted in the introduction, we need to be 
careful to see the nature and extent of the supposed difference between the Greeks and 
ourselves with respect to number.  
We do not deny that some Greek philosophers or mathematicians wondered whether 
one was a number.  However, they did not all agree that it was not. To the extent that 
some Greek mathematicians held that one was not a number, then we might say, that 
the Greek mathematicians had a different concept of number than we do.  But beware! 
Their argument was not about whether Zeus was a number or whether a pig’s ear was 
a number.  It was a disagreement about something that they recognized as being very 
similar to the other ‘numbers’ (two, three, four, and so on).  Further, it was not a 
disagreement which involved any attempt to exclude one from calculation, i.e., from 
use in conjunction with other numbers to do sums in everyday life. Nor was it a 
disagreement whether one was a number, and whether two was a number, and 
whether three was a number, and whether four was a number – it was about one 
specifically (and possibly also two).  
Furthermore, there was not any question with respect to everyday numeracy as to 
whether it was possible for someone to own only ‘one’ sheep or have only ‘one’ coin 
left in their purse, or to sell off one of their two sheep leaving them with only ‘one’.  
Most computation practiced in Ancient Greece was independent of these 
considerations.  In other words, whose concept of number are we are talking about: 
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the concept of all the people living in Greece at that time (or all of us?), including 
those that were barely able to calculate – or only of those very few that were part of 
what we might call professional mathematics?  Would Bloor or Jennings want to say 
that shopkeepers’ concepts of number were very different in Ancient Greece from 
those current in Modern England? 
With respect to the rest of the natural numbers in particular and arithmetic in general, 
the Greek mathematicians had very much the same concept of number as we do – to 
the extent that many of their arithmetical proofs are preserved in our mathematics.  
Furthermore, as Bloor (1976, p.98) himself notes, the reason that for some Greek 
mathematicians one is not a number is “because they saw it as the starting point or 
generator of number”.  In other words, the Greek mathematicians disagreed about the 
status of one relative to the rest of the number system for the same reasons that 
modern mathematicians often give one a special place in the number system: with 
one, it is possible to generate all the other numbers (i.e., 2 is 1 + 1, 3 = 2 + 1 = (1 + 1) 
+ 1, and so on); furthermore, one is not treated as a prime number (although one is 
only divisible by itself).  
It were these distinctive (mathematical) features of one that gave rise to the Ancient 
Greek’s discussion as to whether it was to be regarded as just one more number 
amongst the others, or whether it was so special it was not to be included within the 
number series – just as zero sometimes is and sometimes is not so included as a 
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natural number in modern mathematics14.  In fact, had Bloor based his account not on 
Frege but on Husserl (both 19th century German philosophers) he would have had to 
argue that the Greeks had the same concept of number, as for Husserl zero and one 
were not numbers but only number-like: 
there is something number-like about ‘one’ and ‘none’ in the sense 
that these words can also serve in certain contexts to answer the 
question ‘how many’.  Nonetheless one and none are not numbers in 
the original sense, according to Husserl; they are not Anzahlen. 
(Miller, 1982, p.123) 
Our argument does not deny a difference between those who denied one as being a 
number and our mathematics, nor do we deny that on that basis Ancient Greek 
mathematics could be called an alternative mathematics.  We only would like to note 
that on this basis it does not seem to take very much to qualify something as an 
alternative mathematics.  In other words, one could equally well deem the differences 
over one as so insignificant that it would be an overstatement to count this as a case of 
an alternative mathematics.  One might equally well say that the Ancient Greeks had 
much the same concept of the natural numbers as we do – save for some intelligible 
and computationally inconsequential issues about the status of one relative to the rest 
of the number sequence (as, we repeat, it did not mean that anyone who counted their 
sheep in the Greek’s arithmetic would always be one sheep short).   
                                                 
14 It’s a bit like arguing about whether the foundations are part of the house or not – which does not 
entail any disagreements over which part of the construction is the foundations and which ‘the rest of 
the house’. It is also reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s arguments about the ‘standard metre’ as being 
neither one metre long or not one metre long in an attempt to emphasise its special role in the metric 
system as the thing that is used to give definitive measurement, not something itself to be measured. 
This is not an argument that the standard metre has no length. 
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Overwhelmingly the Ancient Greeks had the same concept of number as we do, 
which is why their mathematics is treated as historically continuous with ‘our’ 
mathematics, e.g., why our mathematicians continue to accept many of their proofs 
(although they might be reformulated in modern mathematical notations and forms). 
The mathematician Hardy, for example, emphasizes that modern mathematicians can 
understand Greek mathematics: 
The Greeks were the first mathematicians who are still ‘real’ to us 
to-day.  Oriental mathematics may be an interesting curiosity but 
Greek mathematics is the real thing.  The Greeks first spoke a 
language which modern mathematicians can understand; [...] So 
Greek mathematics is ‘permanent’, more permanent even than 
Greek literature.  Archimedes will be remembered when Aeschylus 
is forgotten, because languages die and mathematical ideas do not. 
(Hardy, 1940, pp.20-21) 
In other words, the relativist who argues that the Greek and our mathematics 
constitute ‘alternate’ mathematics, cannot account for the continuous nature of 
mathematics15.  
To repeat the point that we made earlier: the philosophical-theoretical status of the 
number one does not underpin the ordinary practices of computation, for, as noted,  
nothing in everyday computational practice is changed by adopting either one or other 
                                                 
15 Hardy also notes that Oriental mathematics differs more significantly from ‘our’ mathematics than 
does the Greeks’. However, this is no embarrassment for our argument, since it takes as a given for all 
parties to discussions about the ‘relativity’ of mathematics that there is no a priori limit to the variation 
that there can be between the mathematics of one culture and another, leaving us free to argue that the 
kind of construal that the relativist would lay on these variations is implausible. Our point is about the 
intelligibility of claims that alien mathematics could directly contradict each other and yet both be true, 
and we have tried to show that the cases which relativists offer do not intimate any such possibility, 
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side on such a point.  We thus agree with Freudenthal (1979, p.75) who argues that 
Bloor and Jennings fail “to distinguish between meta-mathematical arguments and 
mathematical proofs”.  As Triplett (1986, p. 445) points out: Bloor’s and Jennings’ 
arguments do not pertain to mathematics, but to, at best, metamathematics or “various 
philosophical theories about mathematics”16. 
Conclusion: theoretically corrupted portrayals of practice 
The idea that mathematical equations constitute empirical propositions or contain 
ontological assumptions (rather than express rules of a system) runs through much of 
relativists’ discussions.  This leads the relativist to the supposition that it is necessary 
to investigate what the mathematical practices stand for, either by looking at facts of 
nature or at a people’s concepts of numbers. Consequently, our anti-relativist 
arguments advanced in this paper are not to be understood as a (realist) defense of 
Western science (as, for example, pursued by so many of the opponents to the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and poststructuralist approaches). Instead, they 
form an anti-intellectualist Wittgensteinian interrogation of the idea that cultural 
practices are theory-dependent. 
The fact that practices of arithmetical computation are predominantly constant or 
equivalent across the different examples is not actually denied by the relativist, but is 
left in the background in the search (by those desperately seeking differentiation) for 
                                                 
16 Bloor and Jennings may be right to argue that the Ancient Greeks may not have distinguished 
between philosophy and mathematics, or between mathematics and meta-mathematics, but the point of 
distinguishing these in such a connection has less to do with correctly characterising Greek practice 
than it does with conveying to contemporary readers a sense of how significant a difference there is 
between our practice and theirs with respect to e.g. numeracy. 
Page 33 of 36 
 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2006). Mathematical relativism: logic, grammar, and arithmetic in 
cultural comparison. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2), 97-117.  
 
something, anything, in the practice of calculation that might be considered a startling 
difference from our practice. For the relativist it is as though thinly described, 
inconsequential, or peripheral instances could go proxy for proper evidence to support 
the claim that there is a radically alternative mathematics – a mathematics which 
would exhibit a discrepant way of thinking to our own and that would come into 
irresoluble conflict with our mathematics.   
We have been trying to suggest that relativists are apt to confuse the rigidity of 
application of the rules that make up arithmetical systems (i.e., that they are to be 
applied everywhere the same, regardless of who is doing the calculation) with 
people’s supposed beliefs about the status of mathematical truths (e.g., that there can 
only be one mathematical notation). Consequently, relativists are apt to consider it a 
deep and troubling finding that the range of specific mathematical systems is possibly 
restricted to a particular culture, as for the relativist this seems to imply that thereby 
the rigidity of those rules is also restricted. However, that there can be different 
mathematics from our standard mathematics is not something that ordinary people are 
practically unaware of.  In fact, we are all familiar with instances where, for one 
example, five plus eight equals one (on a twelve hour clock). We are thus not denying 
that there are different mathematics, for there are lots of different mathematical 
systems, and they differ in all sorts of ways. Everyone familiar with more than 
elementary mathematics understands that.  We are only contesting the relativist’s idea 
that these are radical divergences, entailing ontological diversity between cultures, 
and that the manifest equivalences between mathematics are only superficial, i.e., 
disguise the real and deeper differences underpinning them. 
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On closer inspection, the offered examples turn out to depend on theoretically 
corrupted portrayals of practice on one or both sides of the cultural separation (and of 
a conflation of philosophical theories about, e.g., measuring with the mundane 
practice of measuring).  The supposedly significantly alternative mathematics 
described turn out to involve minor disputes within the philosophy of mathematics 
(e.g., whether one is a number or not) with little practical consequences.  Or they 
depend on trying to insinuate some philosophical preconceptions about the nature of 
mathematics into everyday understandings of computation on the assumption that 
some such preconceptions must be integrally indispensable to the use of the number 
system.   
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